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THE VIRTUES OF MEDICARE
Jill R. Horwitz*
Medicare Meets Mephistopheles. By David A. Hyman. Washington,
D.C.: Cato Institute. 2006. Pp. xviii, 138. Cloth, $14.95; paper $9.95.
Most of us look forward to a heaven where people don’t get sick. But if
they do, health care would be traded among fully informed patients and providers in perfectly competitive and frictionless markets. In that perfect
world, sick citizens simply shop for doctors the way they shop for other
consumer goods. The better doctors, like the most elegant hotel rooms and
fanciest cars, would cost more than inferior doctors. Patients would consult
their utility meters and, with appropriate attention to discounting over an
infinite lifetime, choose accordingly. After each treatment, the patients
would know the quality of their outcome and would accurately tell their
friends in heaven whether they got a good deal on their appendectomy, bypass surgery, or what have you.
Unfortunately, that’s not the way it works here in the corporeal world.
Illness is messy. Medical treatment is complex. Knowledge is limited. Decisions need to be made quickly. And, therefore, health care markets are a
1
muddle. Enter Professor David Hyman. Posing as Underling Demon 666,
Hyman has written a book-length letter to Satan about Medicare, the federal
2
health insurance program for people age sixty-five and older. In the letter,
Hyman explains that only one thing stands in the way of having heaven’s
health care system here on earth: big government.
The problem with Hyman’s view is that even without big government
sticking its meddlesome finger into the pot, health care markets don’t work
well. Health care markets are all about failures and, unfortunately, the stakes
are high. That’s what makes health care devilish to provide and vexatious to
regulate (and, incidentally, interesting to scholars). That’s also why I think
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School, and Faculty Research
Fellow, National Bureau of Economic Research. Many thanks to Jim Driscoll-MacEachron, Sherry
Glied, Don Herzog, Hyland Hunt, Bill Miller, Austin Nichols, Edward Parson, John Pottow, Peter
Siegelman, Jonathan Skinner, Marc Spindelman, and Harry Swain for helpful comments on early
drafts.
1.

Professor and Galowich-Huizenga Faculty Scholar, University of Illinois College of Law.

2. Medicare also insures people under age sixty-five who are blind, disabled, or have endstate renal disease. A few percent of the elderly are not eligible for Medicare because they do not
qualify as a worker or dependent of a worker with at least forty quarters of Social Security earnings.
Medicare is not to be confused with Medicaid, a joint state-federal program that provides health
insurance to poor people, particularly children who make up almost half of its enrollees. Medicaid
is, however, important for the elderly because “[a]lthough the elderly and people with disabilities
make up just one-quarter of all Medicaid enrollees, they account for 70% of Medicaid spending.”
Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & the Uninsured, The Medicaid Program at a Glance 1
(2007), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7235-02.pdf.
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that Hyman misses his target. Instead of aiming his considerable wit at
Beelzebub’s bureaucrats, those policy planners whom he charges with designing a system that was “dysfunctional from the get-go” (p. 10), he’d do
better to recognize that his problems rest with the nature of health care and
proceed from there. After all, sensible reform must be grounded in reality.
That said, there is a lot to recommend Medicare Meets Mephistopheles.
I’ll briefly touch on three of its virtues (and one of its vices) before considering Hyman’s argument. First, there is a lot of truth in this book. As with
any program of this importance and scale, Medicare is riddled with serious
troubles. Yes, Medicare spending is huge and it will shock many readers to
learn how fast it is growing. Yes, policymakers, analysts, and all but a few
scholars have paid inadequate attention to the program’s distributional consequences. Yes, the new prescription drug plan is not sustainable. And the
list goes on. Despite Hyman’s implication that rampant idiocy, greed, and
corruption are behind these problems, many smart, honest, and hardworking people are struggling to fix the problems he identifies. I know, I
know, the road to hell is paved with good intentions. Still, one need not
abandon all hope before entering the realm of Medicare policy.
Second, Hyman is extraordinarily knowledgeable about health care
regulation and his exposition is succinct. The book is filled with informative
and accurate summaries of Medicare’s complicated program design and
related laws. The summaries of fraud and abuse law, for example, make my
heart sing. I’ve seldom seen such an accessible and accurate primer.
Third, the book identifies crucial issues raised by all large social programs, not just Medicare. For any large program, we need to know whether
the benefits are worth the costs—both on average and at the margin. We also
need to know how those costs are distributed—among young and old,
healthy and sick, rich and poor.
But that is not all we need to know. Although the book covers a vast terrain, I wanted more. Hyman’s arguments only hint at an equally important
matter for social policy. What should we do when such a program is, as it
inevitably will be, imperfect? How should we balance various injustices?
Hyman focuses on Medicare’s financing, oversight, and political problems.
Yet his preferred design, one more oriented to the market, would generate
3
plenty of its own injustice. Why is that better?
A word of warning: The book’s clever approach too often crosses into
the facile, making Hyman’s argument hard to nail down. But if there is a
thesis in this book—beyond that Medicare is big government and big government is bad—it is probably best summed up by Hyman’s claim that “the
very existence of the Medicare program evoked and encouraged gluttony—
and the political consequence of that gluttony was a one-way ratchet that
shifted the costs of the Medicare program to the working population and
away from Medicare beneficiaries” (p. 41). However, Hyman’s refrain about
3. I suspect that Hyman’s answer would rest on principles of libertarian political theory.
Although such a debate is beyond the scope of this review, it may very well lie only slightly below
what seem to be technical disagreements about social insurance arrangements.
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Medicare’s irredeemable sins—it spends too much, for the wrong reasons,
on second-rate stuff, and all from the pockets of the poor—tells a partial and
partisan story.
In addition to obscuring his insights, Hyman’s breezy style too often
crosses into insult, mainly against mommy-party Democrats. Although acknowledging that all politicians pander to voters, Hyman gratuitously asserts
that “Democrats disproportionately emphasize Medicare in their appeals to
the electorate, which is consistent with their basic position that the ‘highest
4
purpose of government is to send people checks in the mail.’ ” Typical is the
unfounded claim that “many of Medicare’s defenders react to even the
slightest criticism of their favorite program with a ferocity that demonstrates
that their enthusiasm has more to do with ideology than the actuarially
sound/goo-goo [that is, good-government] approach they would insist on if
we were talking about anything other than Medicare” (p. 103). Beleaguered
Republicans are mainly guilty of the sin of anger, a reasonable response to
their turncoat members who acted like Democrats in lustfully voting “to
expand an out-of-control entitlement” (p. 65). In politics all sides engage in
shallow and inconsistent argument. Yet it is principally Democrats and
Medicare supporters that Hyman charges with substituting slogan for reason. Despite these distractions, readers should press on.
I. What’s a Few Billion Among Friends?
Hyman starts with a sketch of Medicare’s vastness: “Covering approximately 42 million (primarily elderly) Americans, it funnels almost $340
billion per year into the pockets of physicians, hospitals, clinical laboratories, home health agencies, physical therapists, social workers, [and]
pharmaceutical companies . . . .” (p. xvii). (I’ve heard about the billions lining the pockets of big-pharma execs, but social workers?) Of course, this
money is not sent by the federal government to these professionals in the
form of birthday gifts, but rather through reimbursement for providing services to sick people.
Predictions and polemics aside, Hyman is right that by any measure the
United States spends a lot of money on health care. But Medicare is only
part of the picture. Don’t forget that Medicaid spending is almost as high,
and on top of that there is private insurance and out-of-pocket payments.
Hyman is also right that Medicare massively exceeded its initial cost projections. As Richard Epstein reports in his introduction, “By 1990, Satan had
secured his pound of flesh: total hospital expenditures were more than six
times those originally estimated in 1965” (p. xiv). Pretty soon even these
dollars might come to look like pocket change. By 2050, Medicare spending
alone is projected to increase to 9.2% of GDP from 2.9% today, both be-

4. P. 59. Here Hyman quotes Nicholas Lemann, America Right and Left, Atlantic
Monthly, Apr. 1998, at 103, 108. Lemann’s article, however, does not attribute the view about
government’s highest purpose to Democrats, but rather to a book he is reviewing.
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cause of medical cost growth and the graying of America. Not everyone,
however, is convinced that Medicare’s spending will continue to grow at
6
current rates.
But Hyman didn’t even give the Devil his due. Medicare can be blamed
for much of total U.S. health care spending. People spend more on medical
care when they have insurance than when they don’t. But the spending
growth is much greater when it comes in the form of a public insurance program than through individual insurance coverage. In fact, Amy Finkelstein
has estimated that Medicare’s effect on hospital spending is over six times
larger than what the evidence from individual-level changes in health insurance would have predicted. How can this be? Finkelstein explains that
insuring a large percentage of the population leads to market-wide changes
that go beyond those that would result from the mere aggregation of a bunch
7
of individual decisions to buy insurance. The idea is that if you insure the
elderly in one fell swoop, hospitals will respond to the promise of increased
demand by entering new markets and adopting new practices, despite the
high fixed costs of these activities. The more Medicare spends, the more we
all spend.
Why should we care how much money is spent on health care in the
United States? Per capita health spending varies considerably (more than
8
100 to 1) across nations. Ironically, spending on medical care is lower in

5. David M. Cutler, The Potential for Cost Savings in Medicare’s Future, 2005 Health
Aff. W5-R77, W5-R78, (web exclusive) http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w5.r77v1.
6. Cutler, for example, thinks that spending growth may decline, in large part because the
Medicare population is getting healthier (e.g., lower smoking rates and better control of hypertension). See id. Growth rates may also go down if current trends in the compression of illness into the
later years of life continue; this is because medical spending during the last year of life is twice as
high for people who die young (ages sixty-five to sixty-nine) than for those who die very old (over
ninety). Id. Finally, recent projections do not account for technological innovations, such as laparoscopic surgery, that are cheaper than current interventions. Id. at W5-R79. In addition, Medicare
managed care will likely continue to grow because new retirees are more accustomed to managed
care than past generations of retirees who were familiar only with traditional fee-for-service plans.
For managed care enrollment rates, see Kaiser Family Found., Trends and Indicators in the
Changing Health Care Marketplace § 2 ex.2.17 (2005), http://www.kff.org/insurance/
7031/print-sec2.cfm (last visited Sept. 28, 2007). Cf. Susan Bartlett Foote & Gwen Wagstrom
Halaas, Defining A Future For Fee-For-Service Medicare, 25 Health Aff. 864, 864 (2006) (reporting that by 2013 upwards of eighty-four percent of Medicare enrollees are still predicted to choose
fee-for-service over managed care, but suggesting ways in which care management can be imported
into fee-for-service arrangements).
7. Amy Finkelstein, The Aggregate Effects of Health Insurance: Evidence from the Introduction of Medicare 15 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11619, 2005).
Finkelstein reports as follows:
Data from the National Health Expenditure Accounts indicate that real hospital expenditures
grew by 63 percent between 1965 and 1970, compared to only 41 percent over the previous
five years . . . . The smaller estimates . . . imply that Medicare can account for about one-third
of the growth in hospital spending over this five year period or all of the above-average growth
relative to the previous five years.

Id.
8. William D. Savedoff, What Should A Country Spend On Health Care?, 26 Health Aff.
962, 962 (2007).
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countries with public systems than in countries with private systems. But
people (and countries) have to spend their money on something. We spend a
larger share of our money on the military (4.06% of GDP in 2005) than do
10
France (2.60%) and Tuvalu (which doesn’t have a military to spend money
11
on). Both Sweden (7.7% of GDP in 2004) and Swaziland (6.2%) spend
12
more of their money on education than we do (5.7%). Accordingly, how
much of GDP goes to health care can be understood as a matter of national
13
choice, not whether the country can afford the bill.
Some economists have argued that our spending hasn’t been profligate,
but rather shows good investment sense. David Cutler, for example, argues
that we have gotten more than our money’s worth. Analyzing treatments as
varied as neonatal care and anti-depressants, he demonstrates that people are
living longer and healthier lives because medical care has gotten so much
14
better. Without health insurance, very few sick people would be able to
access this care. Robert Hall and Charles Jones claim that by the middle of
the century we ought to spend more than thirty percent of GDP on health
15
care. This is because while the marginal utility of consumption falls when
we get richer, the marginal utility of spending to live longer does not. More
intuitively, Hall and Jones ask, “As we get older and richer, which is more
valuable: a third car, yet another television, more clothing—or an extra year
16
of life?” The claim has real bite because the elderly are not only living
longer lives, they are increasingly living healthier lives into very old age. So
that extra year is increasingly likely to be spent healthily.
There are, however, a few problems with this argument. First, when
spending gets high enough—some think high enough will come by 2016
17
when almost twenty percent of GDP will go to health spending —we may
start giving up spending money on other things that matter for our quality of
life. It’s one thing if Americans can’t buy the next version of their favorite

9. David M. Cutler, Health Care and the Public Sector, in Handbook of Public Economics 2143, 2168 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 2002).
10. Cent. Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 199, 586 (2006), available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2034rank.html (last visited
Nov. 23, 2007).
11. Id. at 569, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
geos/tv.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2007).
12. The World Bank, World Development Indicators § 2 tbl.2.10, at 86 (2006), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/table2-10.pdf.
13. Michael E. Chernew et al., Increased Spending on Health Care: How Much Can the
United States Afford?, 22 Health Aff. 15 (2003).
14. David M. Cutler, Your Money or Your Life: Strong Medicine for America’s
Health Care System (2004).
15. Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, The Value of Life and the Rise in Health Spending,
122 Q.J. Econ. 39, 40 (2007).
16.

Id.

17. John A. Poisal et al., Health Spending Projections Through 2016: Modest Changes Obscure Part D’s Impact, 26 Health Aff. W242, W242 (2007) (web exclusive), http://content.
healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/26/2/w242.
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video game or the newest model SUV, it is quite another when a country
must skimp on education, national defense, or housing to pay its health care
bill. Second, all is well and good as long as productivity keeps going up and
up and up. But what happens if it doesn’t? Third, we aren’t getting all we
18
could for the money we are spending on health care. However, because
variations in spending patterns are so complex—additional spending in
some regions is worth it and in others is not—you don’t improve the efficiency of Medicare spending by simply refusing to buy the next dollar of
19
health care. So we shouldn’t necessarily spend less; we should spend
smarter.
Hyman would also likely respond to the suggestion that Medicare
spending is worth it by pointing out that what people do with their own
money is their own business. Let them burn it if they want. The problem
with Medicare is that it is “overwhelmingly . . . financed by taxpayers who
are not receiving benefits from the Medicare program” (p. 17). Even if this
is true, why is this so troubling? So what if everyone pays and the sick get
treated?
Hyman’s answer is that Medicare is insidious because it induces people
to spend more money on health care than they otherwise would. People
aren’t paying for health care out of their own pockets; they are using other
people’s money, and spending other people’s money is fun. His argument
blends together two distinct problems that I disentangle below: (1) moral
hazard (with, for Hyman, the added insult that all this spending is buying a
low-quality product) and (2) inequitable distribution.
II. Moral Hazard
Moral hazard is an inevitable cost of insurance. It occurs when an individual consumes more than she otherwise would because she doesn’t have
to pay all the costs of her consumption. People may be less careful when
they are insured, such as driving a little less carefully when their auto insurance includes payments for collision than if they had to pay for the full cost

18. Inefficiency explains some, although not all, of why U.S. health spending is higher than
health spending elsewhere. A summary of several studies suggests that relatively intensive medical
treatment during hospital visits as well as expensive inputs like highly paid doctors and medical
equipment are also to blame. Gerard F. Anderson et al., It’s The Prices, Stupid: Why The United
States Is So Different From Other Countries, Health Aff., May–June 2003, at 89, 98. But there are
inefficiencies in the U.S. system. Although this is not evidence of Medicare’s inefficiency, the fact
that the United States both spends more money per capita and has the highest infant mortality rate
and lowest life expectancy among high-income Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries suggests health spending inefficiency. William C. Hsiao, Why Is a
Systemic View of Health Financing Necessary?, 26 Health Aff. 950, 950 (2007). For examples of
inefficient Medicare spending, see, for example, Jonathan S. Skinner et al., Is Technological Change
In Medicine Always Worth It? The Case Of Acute Myocardial Infarction, 25 Health Aff. W34
(2006) (web exclusive), http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/25/2/w34.
19. E.g., Skinner et al., supra note 18, at W41–W43 (showing that while there is considerable waste in spending, the efficiency of treatments vary considerably by location). Skinner and his
coauthors suggest that a better bet for increasing efficiency is to identify effective treatments and use
education and incentives to increase their use.
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of the body work. Similarly, the argument goes, having health insurance
20
may induce insureds to be less careful with their own health. More plausibly, health insurance can cause patients to go to the doctor more often than
they would otherwise because the additional care is relatively cheap when
insurance covers the bill.
Hyman thinks moral hazard is to blame for Medicare’s dramatic cost
growth. Because they pay so much less than their medical care costs, beneficiaries have become gluttons for medicine. Having insurance has made
Medicare patients—not to mention the doctors who both order the care on
their patients’ behalf and receive the payments—bad shoppers. Like diners
who take that extra trip to the all-you-can-eat buffet, Medicare patients consume too much care—more than the patient would have asked for had she
paid the full bill. Strictly speaking, this conception of medical care under
insurance is absolutely correct. There are some egregious examples of inefficient, not to mention dangerous, care that patients buy and providers sell
mainly because people have health insurance. I remember a few years back
when MRI providers were targeting the “worried wealthy” by advertising
full body scans at Valentine’s Day; presumably many of these were paid
through insurance.
Moral hazard arguments in the context of health care, however, are not
entirely fitting. You don’t have to look hard to find evidence that people
generally become patients because they are sick, not because they are insured. Medical care isn’t very pleasant to consume. Aside from some
cosmetic treatments that are generally not covered by insurance, you don’t
see rich people giving their loved ones gifts of surgery—“Oh, darling, thank
you so much for that weeklong stay in intensive care.”
Measuring moral hazard in the health care context is notoriously hard.
Doing it the usual way—looking at what people would consume absent insurance and deciding the rest is moral hazard—isn’t accurate. People
consume more medical care when they are insured because they can’t afford
it otherwise. If there were no insurance, only a very few of the roughly
225,000 Medicare beneficiaries who have heart attacks each year would
write a $25,000 check for the hospital costs of cardiac bypass surgery
21
alone, never mind the physician, diagnostic and other related medical
treatment, and pharmaceutical costs. Is that because these folks didn’t really

20. Dhaval Dave and Robert Kaestner have found some evidence that being insured by
Medicare reduces prevention and increases unhealthy behavior among beneficiaries. They also
found that these moral hazard effects are smaller than the beneficial preventative effects of physician
counseling that come with the increased contact with doctors because of Medicare coverage. Dhaval
Dave & Robert Kaestner, Health Insurance and Ex Ante Moral Hazard: Evidence From Medicare
33–35 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12764, 2006). The limits to this line of
reasoning are discussed below.
21. Costs based on average Medicare reimbursement estimates for 2006. Guidant Corp.,
2006 FY Medicare Hospital Payment Changes Affecting CABG and Microwave Ablation, available
at http://web.archive.org/web/20061029085712/http://www.guidant.com/reimbursement/cs_codes/
medicare_ip.shtml (last visited Dec. 4, 2007). For more detailed information for earlier years, see
David M. Cutler et al., Pricing Heart Attack Treatments, in Medical Care Output and Productivity 305 (David M. Cutler & Ernst R. Berndt eds., 2001).
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value their treatment at more than $25,000? Or is it because they can’t write
such a check, even though they actually value the care they receive by much
more than its cost? Health insurance induces patients to get the surgery, but
in many cases that’s good, not bad. And it’s not evidence of moral hazard—
or gluttony, as Hyman calls it. Insurance lets sick people get access to very
expensive medical care when they need it, and that’s what it’s supposed to
do.
Because a patient can’t write a check for intensive medical care, therefore, doesn’t mean that the patient’s purchase of the care with insurance is
22
inefficient. (Nor does it necessarily mean that the purchase is efficient.
Gee, I really value that new Ferrari at more than its price; perhaps the government should provide insurance for buying sport cars!) Therefore, we
should not only ask whether people consume more than they otherwise
would because they are insured, but also whether the care being provided is
worth the cost. Unfortunately, that’s a still harder question to answer. It depends on what patients are getting for all these payments as well as the
opportunity costs of public spending. While Hyman is right that Medicare
insurance has tempted patients to spend more than they would otherwise,
that doesn’t mean the temptation is one that patients ought to resist.
III. What Are we Getting for our Money?
Hyman informs us that the Devil is thrilled with all this Medicare spending for two reasons. What we are getting from it is (1) a bunch more
spending and (2) some lousy care.
First, Hyman argues that Medicare’s reimbursement system is inflationary. The old fee-for-service reimbursement system that paid physicians
based on “usual, customary, and reasonable” charges led to skyrocketing
payments (p. 20). Advances in reimbursement systems that did a better job
of mimicking market prices (now almost twenty-five years old for hospital
payments and fifteen years old for physician payments) are so filled with
pathologies that they don’t work either (p. 21).
What’s worse is that beneficiaries of this largess—doctors (who, by the
way, are all private actors) and hospitals (the vast majority of which are also
private)—deliver their Medicare patients care that is “highly mediocre overall, with some of it absolutely appalling” (p. 23). Hyman, who knows his
stuff when it comes to health policy research, knows this because there are
so many studies that identify “overuse, underuse, misuse, unexplained variations in treatment patterns, and outright errors” (p. 23).
Jonathan Skinner and colleagues have found examples of “flat of the
curve” spending—where more spending doesn’t yield more benefit—in
some Medicare regions where doctors and hospitals are spending too much
on expensive and ineffective care and too little on inexpensive and effective

22. John A. Nyman, Is ‘Moral Hazard’ Inefficient? The Policy Implications of a New Theory,
Health Aff., Sept.–Oct. 2004, at 194.
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23

care. Throughout the book, Hyman refers to what can only be described as
shocking geographic variation in patterns of hospital use, surgery, and medical spending. All this is true. One look at the Dartmouth Atlas of Health
24
Care, which documents treatment variation, is enough to make patients
very queasy.
While citing a host of studies by health economists and policy analysts
that identify problems in the Medicare program, he rejects their conclusions.
Whereas researchers focus on particular examples of “defective incentives,
poor information, inadequate monitoring, the state of medical science, noncompliant patients, incompetent providers, and everything else one could
imagine” (p. 23), Hyman would prefer that they conclude that the rot of inefficient spending and bad care lies with Medicare itself. In fact, Hyman
cites one study to support his claim that Medicare is not only wasteful but
also bad for the health of its beneficiaries (p. 25). Unfortunately, it says
something quite different; though the study found a negative correlation
between Medicare spending and quality, it identified the relatively high proportion of specialists in the area as the root of the quality problem, not
25
Medicare spending per se.
Based on an unexamined premise, Hyman assumes reducing government involvement in health care provision will lead to more efficiency and
higher quality. So how does Medicare compare to its alternatives? It’s very
hard to tell. No neat case control study can be done because there is no relevant control group. Almost all of old people who get the illnesses that
Medicare pays to treat are covered by Medicare. There are plenty of studies
comparing various experiments within Medicare, but none that would allow
anyone to conclude that elderly patients would spend less or get higher qual26
ity care without it. Even so, there is plenty of evidence that there is lots of
27
lousy privately provided medical care. There is also some evidence that
Medicare is at least as good as private insurers at containing costs, maybe
28
better. Admittedly, that’s not good enough.
Some scholars find that all insurance, including Medicare and its private
alternatives, has had only a small causal effect on health outcomes; the effects
23. Jonathan Skinner et al., The Efficiency of Medicare 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 8395, 2001).
24.

http://www.dartmouthatlas.org (last visited Sept. 28, 2007).

25. Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, Medicare Spending, The Physician Workforce,
And Beneficiaries’ Quality Of Care, 2004 Health Aff. W4-184 (web exclusive), http://
content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w4.184v1.
26. Although not a sufficient reason to endorse them, large and centralized social insurance
programs produce at least one nice externality: a source for consistent and comprehensive data.
Basing policy responses on analysis of these data is the best we can hope for to improve insurance
arrangements and related health care. The less unified the system, the more difficult it is to study
outcomes like quality.
27. Elsewhere Hyman provides a synopsis of recent quality studies indicating widespread
quality problems and concluding that “Medicare is not immune to these problems.” David A.
Hyman, Does Medicare Care About Quality?, 46 Persp. Biology & Med. 55, 57 (2003).
28. Cristina Boccuti & Marilyn Moon, Comparing Medicare And Private Insurers: Growth
Rates In Spending Over Three Decades, Health Aff., Mar.–Apr. 2003, at 230.
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of insurance, however, are likely larger for populations insured by public
29
programs such as infants, poor children, and the elderly. Amy Finkelstein
and Robin McKnight are two of the few scholars who address the question
of Medicare’s value head on. In their article, What Did Medicare Do (And
Was It Worth It)?, they find that during the program’s first ten years Medicare had no discernable effect on elderly mortality, possibly because elderly
patients with life-threatening conditions had found their way to medical care
30
even before Medicare’s implementation. They concluded, however, that
Medicare’s value as an insurance program, one meant to reduce the risk of
high out-of-pocket spending on health care when it is needed, made it a big
success. They found that Medicare’s effect on risk exposure alone represented the equivalent of between one-half and three-quarters of Medicare’s
31
costs.
IV. Incidence and Inequality
The book’s final theme is that Medicare is a reverse–Robin Hood
32
scheme. It takes from the young and the working poor and gives to the retired wealthy (pp. 12–13). How is this so? Although Medicare’s various
programs are funded differently, overall about 40% of its revenue comes
from payroll taxes and 41% from general tax revenue (p. 18). Wage taxes
are flat, not progressive, and they don’t apply to nonwage sources of income. By definition they come from workers, who are younger and poorer
than Medicare beneficiaries. Only 11% of the program is funded by premiums paid by the elderly beneficiaries who use it and those premiums are not
means tested (p. 18). Attempts to make affluent elderly patients pay more,
such as the Catastrophic Coverage Act, have failed miserably (pp. 42–43).
Hyman’s discussion of Medicare’s distributional effects conflates a few
separate questions, discussed in turn below: (1) Does Medicare transfer
money from workers who are young to retirees who are old? Yes, it’s supposed to. (2) Does Medicare transfer monetary value from the poor to the
rich? It depends on how you count. The rich live longer so they are both
more likely to become eligible for Medicare at all and to enjoy its benefits
for more years. But they also pay more taxes than the poor. (3) Is Medicare
29. Helen Levy & David Meltzer, What Do We Really Know about Whether Health Insurance Affects Health?, in Health Policy and the Uninsured 179 (Catherine G. McLaughlin ed.,
2004).
30. Amy Finkelstein & Robin McKnight, What Did Medicare Do (And Was It Worth It)? 1–2
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11609, 2005).
31.

Id. at 2.

32. According to Hyman, “As a group, the elderly received far more from the public trough
than they ever paid in (and more than is economically sustainable) even before the MMA, which made
things substantially worse for younger taxpayers.” P. 41 (citing Eugene Steuerle & Adam Carasso,
Urban Inst., Lifetime Social Security and Medicare Benefits (2003), available at
http://urbaninstitute.org/UploadedPDF/310667_Straight36.pdf). Clark Havighurst and Barak Richman
have recently argued that it is not just public programs but the private health care system that results
in distributive injustice. Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, Distributive Injustice(s) in
American Health Care, 69 Law & Contemp. Probs. 7 (2006).
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inequitable among the old? That is, do the rich beneficiaries get more out of
the program than do poor beneficiaries? Probably, but the poor show net
gains too. And (4), how do rich compare to poor beneficiaries in terms of
health outcomes? Probably better. Unfortunately, the book does not consider
what are, perhaps, the most important questions for evaluating a social insurance scheme: What are the net insurance benefits for the elderly? For the
poor? For the rich? In other words, how valuable is Medicare insurance in
terms of risk protection to the elderly, many of whom were uninsured before
the program was started?
A. Intergenerational Transfers
Medicare’s design was based on temporary intergenerational transfers.
Today’s working young fund the program for retirees. On its face, this design should not raise distributional concerns because today’s workers are
tomorrow’s beneficiaries. (The first cohort of Medicare beneficiaries received benefits without paying in, but every program needs to start
somewhere.) Further, today’s workers are paying for today’s quality medical
care. Given the march of progress, they’ll be quite happy to find that they
33
are consuming something much better: tomorrow’s medicine. You don’t
see discount offers on last year’s treatments like you see on last year’s car
34
model for a reason.
Regardless, analyzing the financial flows of Medicare in isolation is an
odd exercise. Need every individual public program be neutral among generations? The elderly don’t benefit much, at least directly, from the Head
Start programs. They don’t need to go to preschool themselves. (There
might be considerable indirect benefit to the old from educating the young.
Toting up the costs and benefits is a tricky business.) The elderly need health
insurance more than younger workers because, on average, they get sick
more. Considering total transfers among generations, at least some estimates
suggest that net financial flows go from parents to children rather than vice
35
versa.
As the U.S. population ages, however, fewer workers will have to support an increasingly elderly population. Hyman predicts that the
“intergenerational pyramid scheme” that is Medicare will get worse and will
eventually come crashing down (pp. 79–81). This is open to debate. First,
33. Havighurst and Richman doubt whether each generation will do better than the last because the trend depends on continued upward trends in health care costs and life expectancy.
Havighurst & Richman, supra note 32, at 8 n.1. At this point, I think that we’ve got bigger worries
than whether health care costs will decline. But they are correct that if Medicare loses support and
the program is discontinued, today’s workers will not get the benefit of their payments.
34. Some think it’s a bad reason. Hyman would like to give consumers more ability to trade
off cost against quality. See David A. Hyman, Getting the Haves to Come Out Behind: Fixing the
Distributive Injustices of American Health Care, 69 Law & Contemp. Probs. 265, 272 & n.43
(2006).
35. Theodore R. Marmor & Jerry L. Mashaw, Understanding Social Insurance: Fairness,
Affordability, and the ‘Modernization’ of Social Security and Medicare, 25 Health Aff. W114,
W120 (2006) (web exclusive), http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/25/3/w114.pdf.
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whether transfers will indeed get larger depends on how much medicine
changes over time and how much it will cost. For example, we don’t know
whether genomic developments will make medicine more or less expensive
36
and efficient. Second, demographics are not destiny. Whether Medicare,
like other large social insurance programs, is sustainable depends on economic growth. Historically, each successive generation is more productive
than the last. Even if the next one proves not to be, forecasting fifty years
and more into the future is a perilous business; neither pessimism nor optimism is justified.
Hyman advocates restructuring Medicare to avoid these explicit intergenerational transfers. Doing so will not necessarily help. Unless we are
willing to let elderly people suffer untreated illness and die without care,
they will find some way to get it. Cost-shifting will abound. Some elderly
patients would become eligible for Medicaid, which is funded by state and
federal taxes that young people also must pay. Others will turn to already
overburdened public emergency rooms, both for primary care and the growing number of emergencies that will result. Still others will turn to their
children for financial help. Increased cost-sharing will also lead to service
reductions that may in turn cause increased disability and morbidity among
the elderly. Some children will pay the indirect costs of their parents’ increasing dependence on their attention and care. Younger people,
particularly taxpayers, will pay one way or another.
B. Does Medicare Help the Rich get Richer?
A more troubling issue than intergenerational transfers is how Medicare
distributes across socioeconomic class. Hyman claims the transfers from the
poor to the rich are large (pp. 12–13). The evidence is mixed: some find that
the program redistributes on a financial basis from the rich and educated to
37
the poor and poorly educated. But there is also plenty of evidence that the
rich receive more in Medicare benefits than the poor. This is not surprising.
No one would be stunned to learn that the rich do better than the poor. They
live longer, so they are both more likely than the poor to reach age sixtyfive—when they become eligible for Medicare—and then to stick around
38
even longer while Medicare is paying the bill. However, Medicare payments are only one side of the equation. Richer beneficiaries consume more
but they also pay more in lifetime taxes than do poorer beneficiaries.

36. Medical research and treatments are in the midst of a transformation from anatomybased science to a focus on biochemical processes. Any well-functioning health care system will
have to account for these changes. Harvey Schipper et al., Looking Forward, Moving Forward: An Alternative Path for Canada’s Health Care System 5–6 (2003), http://
changefoundation.com/ (follow “Online Library” hyperlink; then follow “Archived Reports” hyperlink).
37. Jay Bhattacharya & Darius Lakdawalla, Does Medicare Benefit the Poor?, 90 J. Pub.
Econ. 277, 278 (2006).
38. Mark McClellan & Jonathan Skinner, The Incidence of Medicare, 90 J. Pub. Econ. 257,
258 (2006).
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Even considering all these factors, “the highest income households receive[] net benefits (i.e., lifetime expenditures less lifetime taxes) slightly
39
higher than those in lower income groups.” So on a financial basis, the rich
40
do better than the poor. There is some evidence that this gap is shrinking.
But we aren’t there yet. Regardless, this conclusion does not provide sufficient reason to tank the program. The poor are receiving net benefits, just
41
not as many as the rich. Medicare is still worth it for the elderly poor, just
not as worth it as it could (or should) be. If Hyman is interested in redistributing wealth, I’ve got a lot of methods more direct and efficient than
tinkering with the health care system. We should talk.
In any event, the monetary benefits that flow from Medicare—the main
concern of Medicare Meets Mephistopheles—are not the only distributional
issue raised by the Medicare program. As Mark McClellan and Jonathan
Skinner explain, “dollar flows of money are not the appropriate way to
42
judge the value of any social insurance program.” Before Medicare was
enacted, many poor people were uninsured or underinsured. Medicare provided risk protection to people who were previously unable to get it. So it’s
important to identify what Medicare provided in terms of insurance value to
its beneficiaries and to identify “the differential insurance value between
43
high and low income households.” From this perspective, the results look
pretty good. Beneficiaries at every level of income show net gains from having access to the insurance provided by Medicare and the poor show bigger
44
gains than the rich.

39.

Id.

40. Jonathan Skinner & Weiping Zhou, The Measurement and Evolution of Health Inequality: Evidence from the U.S. Medicare Population 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 10842, 2004) (“Between 1987 and 2001, we found a dramatic increase in health care expenditures among the lowest income groups, accounting for a 78 percent increase ($2,624) in real terms
compared to a 34 percent increase ($1,214) for those in the top income decile.”). As the authors
point out, there are problems with this measure. It could reflect preferences, ill health among the
poor, access, and spending on things that don’t help. Id.
41. At every level of wealth, people pay less in taxes than Medicare spends on their behalf.
Further, McClellan and Skinner note:
Medicare effects a modest redistribution from lower income to higher income households . . . .
The lowest income decile is estimated to receive a net transfer of $978 (for a total generational
transfer of $27,251), the 3rd decile within-cohort redistribution is –$1,017 (total transfer of
$25,256), while the highest income decile nets $1,381 (total transfer of $27,654).

McClellan & Skinner, supra note 38, at 264–65 (internal cross-references omitted).
42.

Id. at 258.

43.

Id.

44. Id. at 270 (“[O]nce again removing the mean intergenerational transfer (in this case,
$41,254) the intragenerational transfers are tilted toward lower income households. Net intragenerational benefits for the bottom income decile ($8,210) far exceed the net contributions of the highest
decile (-$4,105).”).
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C. Health Outcomes
So far this discussion has been all about whether Medicare transfers
money and insurance value. What about health? As discussed above, establishing a causal link between insurance and health outcomes is difficult.
However, scholars have found that during the 1990s, higher income beneficiaries had greater gains in life expectancy (0.8 years among the highest
income decile) and more effective medical interventions for various conditions than lower income beneficiaries (0.2 years among the lowest income
45
decile). Further, “better educated patients get access to newer drugs . . . ,
survive longer following the diagnosis of cancer . . . and comply better with
46
regimens for the treatment of AIDS.”
This is a problem and there are ways to address it. For example,
Jonathan Skinner and Weiping Zhou suggest nondiscrimination rules that
penalize providers for supplying relatively less effective care to low-income
47
compared to high-income patients. Yet even if these problems can’t be
solved, do you think poor patients want to give up those life years they
gained from the program just because someone else got a better deal?
V. The Market: Heaven on Earth
Medicare Meets Mephistopheles only briefly attempts to tell us what to
do about all this. Given Hyman’s anti-government rhetoric, it is surprising
he doesn’t suggest that we let the entirety of Medicare burn in hell. Rather,
the book concludes with a short outline of a few policy reforms—and here
the reader should be warned the Devil has not provided many details—in
which Hyman makes clear that large command and control programs don’t
hold much truck for him (Chapter Eleven). He sums up the policy proposals
under the heading, “Demand Side Conservatism.” The idea is that since it is
impossible for Big Government to muster the discipline to control health
care supply it’s better to shrink “the demand for government by empowering
individual citizens to make their own decisions, and making them more selfreliant and responsible, and less dependent on government” (p. 87).
How can government empower its citizens? With incentives that induce
them to voluntarily limit their spending on medical care. The menu mostly
consists of familiar fare: replace defined benefits with defined contributions,
48
introduce individual health savings accounts (“HSAs”), and authorize private contracting between patients and doctors to replace publicly negotiated
and regulated contracts. Consider what these reforms mean and “empowerment” begins to look like a bunch of Orwellian doublespeak. To empower

45.

Skinner & Zhou, supra note 40, at 2.

46.

Id. at 1 (citations omitted) (citing several studies).

47.

Id. at 21.

48. HSAs are savings accounts, owned by individuals, filled with pretax dollars for the purpose of buying current or future medical care. They are commonly used in conjunction with
catastrophic coverage insurance plans—plans that cover only very high spending.
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individuals to function like grownups—that is to make the most of the resources they happen to have in negotiating contracts in a free market—
means to unravel insurance markets, make care too expensive for all but the
very rich to buy, and let the sick suffer.
Before making these suggestions, Hyman was spot-on when he hinted
that insurance should be designed with cost sharing at the front end (pp. 46–
47), both to discourage wasteful spending and because the front end is
where many people can afford it. Policymakers understand this. This is why
Medicare beneficiaries are subject to both deductibles and co-payments,
both of which are already pretty high. In 2007, the deductible for Part A,
hospital insurance, was $992 (with co-payments for hospital stays at $248
per day for days 61–90, $496 per day for days 91–150, and then, unfortu49
nately, the beneficiary becomes responsible for all costs).
In theory, HSAs coupled with high-deductible insurance plans would
make patients even more cost-sensitive. In practice it has proven difficult to
design systems that both make patients cost-sensitive and still insure them
50
for big losses. Medicare spending is concentrated among a very small percentage of beneficiaries. In 2001, 5% of the top spending beneficiaries
accounted for 43% of total spending, on average $63,000 per person, and
51
the top 25% accounted for 85% of annual expenditures. Cost sharing
would have to be untenably high to make much of a dent in this. And how,
exactly, will that HSA-wielding citizen escape being treated by anything but
the style of medical care available in his hometown? Patients have a hard
enough time figuring out which treatment is most likely to help their medical problem, how are they supposed to judge which one is the most costefficient? Seems like regulation is a better bet. Finally, although the book is
too sketchy on the details to know what Hyman has in mind, HSAs are typically inequitable. Because they allow people to spend with pretax money,
they benefit the rich more than the poor. So much for distributional concerns.
Insurance is supposed to protect people from the big, unpredictable hits.
Yet the defined contribution plans that Hyman advocates might very well
cut people off when the big bills began rolling in. HSAs with high deductibles and catastrophic care are great plans for the healthy and the rich, so
they would be quite likely to take advantage and opt out of group plans that
52
pool risks and make insurance feasible. Another of Hyman’s proposals is
to allow doctors to treat Medicare beneficiaries for covered benefits both
through the program and by contracting around it. How fast would you like
49. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., The Official U.S. Government Site for People
with Medicare, http://www.medicare.gov/Updates.asp (follow “2007 Medicare premiums and coinsurance rates” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 28, 2007). Wealthy people, however, tend to purchase
supplemental insurance that they use to pay for co-payments and deductibles, creating both inefficiency and inequity.
50. Dahlia K. Remler & Sherry A. Glied, How Much More Cost Sharing Will Health Savings
Accounts Bring?, 25 Health Aff. 1070, 1074 (2006).
51.

Cong. Budget Office, High-Cost Medicare Beneficiaries 2 (2005).

52.

Marmor & Mashaw, supra note 35, at W126.
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to see risk pools disintegrate? Economically rational doctors would be
thrilled to sign up the low-risk patients and take their money, leaving the
actual sick people to get treated elsewhere. The list goes on, but the suggestions add up to risk segmentation and the attendant welfare losses. It is
likely that Hyman’s proposals will shift the risk from large pools to individual patients, increase the cost of care for the sick, and restrict the access of
those who most need treatment.
Of course, I could be underestimating what the elderly would do with
their newfound liberation from the nanny state. Unburdened of Medicare’s
chains, they might start saving. They might analyze insurer, physician, and
hospital report cards to choose the best providers. They might vote with
their wallets, buying medicine through insurance plans that give them the
biggest bang for their buck. They might choose bigger risk pools just to give
their neighbors a hand. The medical system would then be streamlined, efficient, and a whole lot cheaper.
This vision may be heavenly, but it is seriously unrealistic. It doesn’t
take into account how actual human beings behave or how the world of
health care works. Young and healthy people have little understanding of
what it is like to be sick, and as a result they often don’t plan for illness.
Meanwhile, old and sick people are often scared and confused. This doesn’t
mean people are immature or bad or economically irresponsible. It means
that they are human. Even those of us with years of specialized training in
health policy can find it difficult to choose among insurance plans and negotiate in the world of medicine when we or people we love get sick.
Under the best of circumstances, it is very difficult to evaluate health
care. After you’ve taken your medicine, it is hard to know whether you got
better because of the medicine, the skill of the doctor, the passage of time,
53
or the luck of the draw. Although there have been some developments in
quality improvement such as increasingly sophisticated report cards and
pay-for-performance approaches, at least in the short term they have been
less successful than Hyman suggests. Leemore Dafny and David Dranove
have shown that Medicare patients respond to report cards ranking Medicare
53. When critics of regulation and public health care acknowledge that health care is a merit
good, they often advocate for service guarantees. See, e.g., Havighurst & Richman, supra note 32, at
51. For example, they suggest guaranteeing a basic package of care and making the rest of health
care subject to real markets. Id. In principle this is an elegant solution. In real life, how would this
work? How do you define essential care? You try it. In these parlor games, cosmetic surgery always
comes up first. But remember lots of cosmetic surgery goes to burn victims, fixing congenital defects, or breast reconstruction after a mastectomy. Ok, we’re all in agreement: no more using public
dollars for cosmetic breast augmentation, no more liposuction, no more hair transplants for bald
men. But those were, of course, never on the list. Look what happened when we tried to get serious
about deciding on these lists, at least in part, democratically. Oregon tried and what happened?
There was widespread controversy, alteration to the proposed rankings of services, and ultimately
little in the way of rationing or cost savings. Jonathan Oberlander et al., Rationing medical care:
rhetoric and reality in the Oregon Health Plan, 164 Can. Med. Ass’n J. 1583 (2001). People differ
regarding what is an important benefit. Hyman and I do. He mocks Massachusetts for mandating
infertility treatment as part of insurance plans in Massachusetts. David A. Hyman, The Massachusetts Health Plan: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, Pol’y Analysis, June 28, 2007, at 1, 6,
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-595.pdf. Infertility treatment—frivolous or important—what do you think?
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HMOs, but they do so based on the subjective measures of patient satisfac54
tion rather than more objective measures of treatment quality. Risk
adjustment remains hard and the costs of getting it wrong are very high
since the best way to produce great outcomes is to avoid sick patients and
treat healthy ones. Pay-for-performance systems haven’t, at least yet, proved
55
to be very effective. They also tend to disadvantage poor patients and racial
56
minorities. These are just a few of the problems with embracing a market
model and abandoning regulation.
Yet Hyman wonders why “almost no one has asked why the form of
price setting used by the government in other parts of procurement (competitive bidding) is effectively nonexistent in Medicare” (p. 22). States have
57
experimented with competitive bidding with limited success. But as
Hyman explains, federal efforts have had trouble even getting off the
ground, in part because interest groups such as private insurers opposed the
58
programs. On the other hand, competitive bidding has been more successfully used for purchasing durable medical equipment. That’s because buying
wheelchairs and canes through a competitive process is a lot more straightforward than buying health care.
Even if political opposition could be overcome, it is unclear whether
merely increasing competition absent extensive regulation would get what
Hyman wants. The most recent efforts to introduce more competition into
Medicare have provided beneficiaries with more choices among health insurance plans, but they have also increased Medicare spending and
59
increased the likelihood of fragmenting risk pools. Further, where quality
is hard to measure, even ex post, competition doesn’t necessarily improve
60
quality. There is a small industry of scholarly work that explains all the
ways health care markets deviate from ordinary markets, with more detail

54. Leemore S. Dafny & David Dranove, Do Report Cards Tell Consumers Anything They
Don’t Already Know? The Case of Medicare HMOs 28–29 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11420, 2005).
55. See, e.g., Arnold M. Epstein, Pay for Performance at the Tipping Point, 356 New Eng. J.
Med. 515 (2007); Meredith B. Rosenthal & Richard G. Frank, What Is the Empirical Basis for
Paying for Quality in Health Care?, 63 Med. Care Res. & Rev. 135, 151–53 (2006).
56. Lawrence P. Casalino et al., Will Pay-For-Performance And Quality Reporting Affect
Health Care Disparities?, 26 Health Aff. W405 (2007) (web exclusive), http://content.
healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/26/3/w405.
57. Several states have experimented with competitive bidding in their Medicaid programs.
The results have been mixed and the potential for long-term savings uncertain. See, e.g., Lynn
Paringer & Nelda McCall, How Competitive Is Competitive Bidding?, Health Aff., Winter 1991,
at 220.
58. Pp. 55–56 (citing Bryan Dowd et al., A Tale Of Four Cities: Medicare Reform And Competitive Pricing, Health Aff., Sept.–Oct. 2000, at 9); see also Len M. Nichols & Robert D.
Reischauer, Who Really Wants Price Competition In Medicare Managed Care?, Health Aff.,
Sept.–Oct. 2000, at 30.
59. Marsha Gold, Medicare Advantage In 2006-2007: What Congress Intended?, 26 Health
Aff. W445, W454 (2007) (web exclusive), http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/26/4/w445.
60.

Cutler, supra note 9, at 26.
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61

than I can offer here. Suffice it to say that health care is not a typical commodity and treating it as such would bring dire consequences.
Perhaps Medicare Meets Mephistopheles’ most disconcerting prescription is its plan to address distributional injustice via means testing. Making
the rich elderly pay more for their care than they now do seems compelling
in a world with limited resources. But Hyman is nothing if not politically
astute. He knows that extensive means testing will transform Medicare into
a program for the poor elderly. And “[o]nce the Medicare program does not
include all the elderly, it becomes much easier for legislators to impose significant funding and benefit cuts, and the political punch of pro-Medicare
demagoguery becomes much less powerful when all that is at stake is the
health and welfare of poor people” (p. 89). Segregate the poor and then cut
their benefits.
Maybe it’s the Devil who helps those who help themselves (and only
themselves). Never taking the idea of solidarity seriously, Hyman mocks
those who embrace such ideas for “their continued willingness to guzzle
communitarian Kool-Aid” (p. 70). Hyman, though, has perhaps guzzled his
own flavor of Kool-Aid; regardless of the benefits of universal insurance for
the elderly, either in the form of political unity or spillover benefits, practical politics will stop the Devil in his tracks. There is no way on God’s green
earth that the current generation of wealthy, elderly beneficiaries is going to
permit their Medicare benefits to be cut.
In 1969, Harold Demsetz coined the term “nirvana approach” to describe a faulty form of public policy analysis in which the analyst notes that
perfect markets would produce a particular result, observes that actual markets aren’t perfect, and therefore concludes that government should step in
62
to regulate them. In Medicare Meets Mephistopheles, Hyman engages in
something like a reverse nirvana fallacy. He notes that perfect markets
would produce a particular result, observes that Medicare isn’t perfect, and
therefore concludes that we should let actual markets reign to reach his desired result. Yet Hyman’s idea of actual markets is decidedly idealistic. And,
according to Demsetz, the relevant policy choice is between “alternative real
institutional arrangements,” not between “an ideal norm and an existing
63
‘imperfect’ institutional arrangement.” To consider whether Medicare or a
market-based alternative is the better way to go, we need to consider the
market alternative with all its warts—the inevitable moral hazard and adverse selection, the rampant externalities, the incentives for providers to
skimp on quality, and human weakness.
This is why Medicare Meets Mephistopheles is a terrific overview of a
troubled system, but a missed opportunity to help reform Medicare. Providing health care fairly and efficiently is a complicated process that
61. See, e.g., David M. Cutler & Richard J. Zeckhauser, The Anatomy of Health Insurance
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7176, 1999).
62.
(1969).
63.

Harold Demsetz, Information and Inefficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & Econ. 1
Id. at 1.
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necessarily involves a heavy dose of government. Libertarian railing against
big government, regulation, and all lefty foolishness that market proponents
despise doesn’t get one very far in determining how to get health care to 300
million people. In the end Hyman doesn’t offer any realistic alternative to
this government-regulated muddle because, God knows, his plans are unacceptable anywhere but in hell.
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